A fundamental shift is underway in Europe. In March, French President Emmanuel Macron gave a groundbreaking speech, offering to extend his country’s nuclear umbrella to its allies in Europe.
Delivered at the Ile Longue naval base in Brittany, homeport to four nuclear-powered submarines, Macron’s speech raised the prospect that Europe might get an independent nuclear deterrent under French control.
Commenting on the development, Nick Witney, a defence expert with the European Council on Foreign Relations, said Macron had delivered “the most significant speech on nuclear policy by any Western leader since the end of the Cold War”, signalling an autonomous future for European defence, separate from the US.
The response from European governments has been equally remarkable: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Latvia have all expressed willingness to join Macron’s nuclear deterrence initiative.
Several of these countries are staunch Atlanticists. As recently as a year ago, they would likely have baulked at the idea of a French security option, fearing it might antagonise the Trump administration in the US and split NATO.
Two major gamechangers have since emerged, however: the agendas of US President Donal Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Russia’s relentless bombing of Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, following its 2022 invasion, is aimed at breaking the morale of the Ukrainian population.
Europe’s security and intelligence officials warn that Russia’s war against Ukraine is just one part of the equation, however. The other is Russia’s use of hybrid warfare tactics, such as cyber and drone attacks, to intimidate European citizens.
Trump has barely acknowledged Russia’s interference in Europe, let alone recognised it for what it is: an effort to decouple Europe from the US, leaving it vulnerable.
As such, NATO allies are unconvinced that Trump would invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, under which NATO would defend a member under attack.
Europeans no longer take America’s post-Cold War security umbrella for granted. That is why they are looking to France.
As President of France during the 1960s, Charles de Gaulle sought to achieve strategic independence for his country, partly by putting in place a sovereign nuclear deterrent.
Today, the country’s 300 nuclear warheads are entirely French and under French control – by contrast, Britain’s 250 warheads rely on technical input from the US.
If European countries were to come under France’s nuclear umbrella, they would be bound by several conditions – and France alone would make the decisions.
As Macron prepares to leave his post next year, Presidential hopefuls are accusing him of sharing France’s nuclear arsenal.
French Prime Minister Sebastien Lecornu has been quick to respond, stating that the nuclear deterrent “is French and will remain French – from its conception to its production to its operation, under a decision of the President”.
European governments know this. As it is, they don’t have any say over American decisions on nuclear policy, but at least there still exists the policy of nuclear burden-sharing under which US nuclear bombs are stored in five European countries.
This gives these European countries some insight into US nuclear planning. So far, France hasn’t proposed a similar burden-sharing arrangement.
Macron has to finesse his offer, but given the unpredictability of both Russian and US leaders, Europe must now prepare for a new strategic and security future – and quickly.
*Disclaimer: The views expressed in this column, published in the October/November 2026 issue of Accountancy Ireland, are the author’s own. The views of contributors to Accountancy Ireland may differ from official Institute policies and do not reflect the views of Chartered Accountants Ireland, its Council, its committees, or the editor.
Judy Dempsey is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe
